ICBMs (Photo credit: xmatt)
By Russell Drew
The Obama White House had to look tough on national security before the last election. Okay, they won. Now, in the throes of sequestration, continuing resolutions and budget battles, it is high time to clean out the Pentagon’s closet full of wishes and get realistic.
The administration’s resolve to try to lead from the front to blunt North Korea’s threats and Iran’s nuclear weapons program has led to a flock of failed initiatives, not the least of which is the European Phased Adaptive Approach’s Phase IV (EPAA) and its keystone ICBM interceptor, the Standard Missile-3 Block IIB. The idea, in 2009, was to upgrade the SM-3 to a Block IIB version that would be deployed in Poland and Romania to add another layer of American defenses to the European theater. Besides setting Moscow’s hair on fire, this version of EPAA turned out to be a bad idea for other reasons.
First, it turned out that positioning Block IIB missiles in Europe will not enable the missiles to effectively intercept Iranian ICBMs. An American east coast missile base would give better cover. Second, and most importantly, the proposed Block IIB missiles are now just a vague notion on PowerPoint slides. Even if the final design and test and development went perfectly, the earliest the missiles could be deployed is 2022. After a few billion dollars.
The Block IIB missile is a sunk plan, and bureaucrats, concerned citizen groups, and congress are jumping off the boat.
In April last year, the National Taxpayers Union (and six other concerned citizens’ organizations) signed an open letter to Congress saying, “...the Administration’s move to continue funneling money into IIB is not prudent.” The following September the National Research Council (NRC) cast doubt on Block IIB effectiveness. And this January the Government Accounting Office briefed the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, using the Pentagon’s own studies to underpin its agreement with the NRC report.
Though some conservative commentators call the President’s decision to abandon the Block IIB in Europe a “gift to the Russians,” the fact remains that the missile concept has too many flaws and technical challenges.
With so many negative findings, it is no wonder that House Strategic Forces Subcommittee member Mike Turner (R-OH) told Missile Defense Agency Director Patrick O’Reilly that he was concerned “we may be throwing paper wads of designs of IIBs rather than throwing actual interceptors that could make a difference for the defense of our nation.” The murky battlefield between the Obama administration’s Missile Defense Agency and Congress was further illuminated when Congress passed a Continuing Resolution last month to keep the government running. In it, the House took $162 million from the President’s Budget request of $224 million for Block IIB, leaving $62 million for continuing the design program.
But the message is clear: we can’t afford pie in the sky these days, especially since less expensive missiles do the job and will be deployed soon. So why waste that remaining $62 million? We all know that when a defense project fails, it joins the living dead for years. Still, $62 million is a lot to pay for Pentagon bureaucrats in a defunct program. Or is it the defense contractors? The White House and Congress should simply tell the Pentagon to kill the zombie and call it a day.
Finally, don’t sweat the Russians. Because the Block IIB missile is larger (on paper) than its predecessors, and might be configured with a warhead, Moscow thinks it is part of a new and secret U.S. “first strike” capability and endangers their ICBMs, the only credible Russian military force since Soviet days. Putin is not our pal, and even if he was, it is still no gift to Russia if new ICBM defenses move to the American homeland, on the ground or offshore on Aegis cruisers.
Congress should not spend another dime on the SM-3 IIB, and if they simply must buy something new, build that east coast ICBM interceptor missile base. Americans need the protection -- and the jobs.
Dr. Russell C. Drew is a retired Navy Captain and the former head of the Office of Naval Research in London. During 23 years of public service, Drew also served as assistant to the President's Science Advisor, staff director of the President's Space Task Group, and director of the National Science Foundation's Science and Technology Policy Office.
